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In the last quarter-century the writings by ProfessolsMyres S.
*I am indebted to Michael Forde of Cambridge University for his cri-
tical comments and many useful suggestions on an earlier draft of ti-is es-
say. Responsibility for the views expressed, however, is my own.
This is an essay of invitation addressed to anyone interested in the
New Haven school of jurisprudence. Because many scholars and decision-
makers believe that law is no more than an autonomous body of rules and
brush aside jurisprudential consideration of policy as an intrusion of
"politics" into the realm of "law," this essay at the same time means
to welcome a debate necessary for dissipating the misunderstanding about
the evaot role of policy consideration in legal science and improving an
intellectual framework for rational decision. More than two decades have
elapsed since Professors McDougal and Lasswell urged a "new direction" in
legal education. As their recommendation has generally fallen upon deaf
ears and as many students are not aware of it, the core of their argument
needs reiteration:
The major contours of our contemporary confusion
have long been plainly visible. Heroic, but random,
efforts to integrate "law" and "the other social sci-
ences" fail through lack of clarity about what is be-
ing integrated, and how, and for what purposes. Lip-
service is paid to the proposition that legal concepts,
institutions, and practices are instrunental only; but
the main organizing foci for determining both fields
and courses, and arrangement within fields and courses,
McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and W. Michael Reisman have marked the
of a swollen. and shapless curriculum are still time-
worn, overlapping, legal concepts of highest-level
abstraction. Any relation between the factual pro-
blems that incidentally creep into particular fields
or courses, in a curriculum so "organized," and the
important problems of contemporary society is purely
coincidental; and all attempts to relate such fields
or courses to each other are frustrated by lack of
clear social goals and inadequate criteria of impor-
tance.
A first indispensable step toward the effective
reform of legal education is to clarify ultimate
aim. We submit this basic proposition: if legal
education in the contemporary world is adequately
to serve the needs of a free and productive common-
wealth, it must be conscious, efficient, and sys-
tematic training for policy-making. The proper
function of our law school is, in short, to con-
tribute to the training of policy-makers for the'
ever more complete achie:ement of the democratic
values that constitute the professed ends of Ameri-
can polity.
This end is not proposed as something utterly new
or exotic. . . . None who deal with law, however de-
fined, can escape policy when policy is defined as
the making of important decisions which affect the
distribution of values. Even those who still insist
that policy is no proper concern of a law school ta-
citly advocate a policy, unconsciously assuming that
-the ultimate function of law is to maintain existing
social institutions in a sort of timeless status quo;
what they ask is that their policy be smuggled in,
without insight or responsibility. But neither a
vague and amorphous emphasis on social "forces,"
"mores," and "purposes" nor a functionalism that dis-
solves legal absolutism for the benefit of random and
poorly defined ends nor a mystical invocation of the
transcendental virtues of an unspecified good life
car effect the fundamental changes in the traditional
law school that are now required to fit lawyers for
their contemporary responsibilities. Their direction
is toward policy but their directives are at too high
a level of abstraction to give helpful guidance. What
ie needed now is to implement ancient insights by re-
emergence of a new theory about law.I It is blended by the traditions of
American legal realism and some of the best contemporary thought of the
orienting every phase of law school curricula and
%skill training toward the achievement of clearly
-defined democratic values in all the areas of so-
cial life where lawyers have or can assert respon-
sibility.
Lasswell & McDougal, "Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest," 52 Yale L. J. 43, 44, 46-47 (1943).
Reiterating parts of the 1943 statement, I am, in effect, suggest-
Ing that they launch their renewed activities to reform legal education
for the future. In light of a general change in attitudes toward multi-
disciplinary studies and unavoidable needs for integrating law and social
sciences, and with a larger and growing "constituency" which now exists
throughout the country, a renewed recommendation may precipitate signi-
ficant recognition of needs for a multidisciplinary, problem-oriented
and contextual intellectual framework for inquiry. What is needed now
is an impetus and catalyst by which law school reformers, potentially
.sympathetic to the New Haven recommendations, will be "triggered" into
redesigning legal education at their own law schools. Those reformers
.may need a new set of symbols to which they can conveniently resort in
stimulating their intellectual environment and justifying their efforts.
1The principal published works of the New Haven School of Interna-
tional Law include: Harold D. Lasswell & Abraham Kaplan, Power and So-
ciety (1950); Myres S. MeDougal & Associates, Studies in World Public Or-
der (1960); McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Pub-
lic Order: The Legal Regulation of International Coercion (1961); McDou-
gal & William T. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans (1962); McDougal,
Lasswell & Ivan A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (1963); McDou-
gal, Lasswell & James C. Miller, The Interpretation of Agreements and
World Public Order (1967); Douglas M. Johnson, The International Law of
Fisheries: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiries (1965); B. S. Mur-
ty, The Ideological Instruments of Coercion and World Public Order (1967);
W. Michael Reisman, Nullity and Revision: The Review of Enforcement of
International Judgments and Awards (1971). Works in progress include:
McDougal, Lasswell & Lung-chu Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order,
from which the authors have published preliminary outlines, "Human Rights
and World Public Order: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry," 63 Am.
J. Int'l L. 237 (1967), "Human Rights and World Public Order: Principles
of Content and Procedure for Clarifying Com-aunity Policies," 14 Va. J.
Int'l L. 387 (1974), and a section "Nationality and Human Rights: The
Protection of the Individual in Fxternal Arenas," 83 Yale L. J. 900 (1974);
social sciences2 and exhibits the common framework of inquiry, distinc-
tively identifiable in its coherent and systematic approach to the study
of law.
Lasswell & McDougal, Law, Science and Policy: The Jurisprudence of a
Free Society, of which two chapters have been published, "Criteria for
a Theory About Law," 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 362 (1971), and "Trends in Theo-
ries About Law: Comprehensiveness in Conceptions of Constitutive Pro-
cess," 41 Ge. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1972): McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The
World Constitutive Process and Public Order, of which three chapters have
been published, "Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Configu-
rative Jurisprudence," 8 Va. J. Int'l L. 138 (1968), "World Constitutive
Process of Authoritative Decision," 19 J. Legal Ed. 253, 403 (1967) and
"The Intelligence Function.and World Public Order," 46 Temple L. Q. 365
(1973).
"How long will our collaboration last?" asked Professor Lasswell,
and answered himself, "As long as we do." Lasswell, "In Collaboration
with McDougal," 1 Denver J. Int'l L. & Policy 17, 19 (1971).
2 See generally Lasswell & McDougal, "Legal Education and Public Po-
licy: Professional Training in the Public Interest," 52 Yale L. J. 40Z
(1943); McDougal, "Fuller v. The American Legal Realists: An Interven-
tion," 50 Yale L. J. 827 (1947); McDougal, "The Law School of thAe Future:
From Legal Realism to Policy Science in the World Community," 5b Yale L.
J. 1345 (1947), in which Professor McDougal urged a new direction for legal
education which would integrate social sciences and law:
It is . . . the opportunity, and the obligation, of
this law school, as of other law schools, to emerge
from the destructive phase of legal scholarship-in-
dispensable though destruction was--and to center its
energies upon conscious efforts to create the legal
institutions, doctrines, and practices of the future.
The time has come for legal realism to yield pre-
dominant emphasis to policy science, in the world
community and all its constituent communities. It
is time for corrosive analysis and inspired destruc-
tion to be supplemented by purposeful, unremitting
efforts to apply the best existing scientific know-
ledge to solving the policy problems of all our com-
munities.
Id. at 1349.
They call this new theory "a policy-oriented jurisprudence" since a
jurisprudence that conceives law as a product of and an instrument in so-
ciety must promote preferred ends of a society. Their approach to law
continually attracts students specializing in international law to New
Haven who afterward go out to create and disseminate their own approach
to, and application of, this theory, sometimes referred to as "a configu-
rative jurisprudeice." Some observers call this emerging group of scho-
lars from New Haven and their characteristic conceptions of law "The New
Haven Approach"'3 or "The Yale School of International Law,"4 in allusion
to, and contrast with, Hans Kelsen's Vienna school.5
"A school" emerges both self-consciously and by being identified as
such by others; a group, if significant, may develop into a school when
its practice of the common mode of expression or its application of a com-
mon methodology flourishes at a given time and space.
Though this statement was made in 1947, in light of a buraeoning re-
vival of interest in the New Haven school, it is hoped that the hypotheses
of McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman will receive critical examination and
constructive challenges. For recent renewed jurisprudential i.nterest in
the New Haven school, see Young, "International Law and Social Science:
The Contributions of Myres S. McDougal," 66 Am. J. Int'l L. 60 (1972);
McDougal, "International Law and Social Science: A Mild Plea in Avoi-
dance," id. at 77. 14 Va. J. Int'l L. (1974), a special issue highlight-
Ing "The Lasswell-McDou al Approach," which include articles such as: Mc-
Dougal, "Human RightS and World Public Order: Principles of Content and
Procedure for Clarifnir~q General Community Policies," at 387; Wood, "Pub-
lic Order and Political Integration in Contemporary International Theory,"
at 423; Little, "Toward Clarifying the Grounds of Value-Clarification: A
Reaction to the Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence of Lasswell and McDougal,"
at 451; and Tipson, "The Lasswell-McDougal Enterprise: Toward A World
Public Order of Human Dignity," at 535.
3 Falk, "On Treaty Interpretation and the New Haven Approach," 8 Va.
J. Int'l L. 330 (1968).
4Gottlieb, "The Conceptual World of the Yale School of International
Law," 21 World Pol. 109 (1963). Farer, "International Law and Political
Behavior: Toward A Conceptual Liaison," 25 World Pol. 430 (1973).
5Kunz, "The 'Vienna School' and International Law," 11 N. Y. Univ.
L. Q. Rev. 370 (1934), reprinted in idem , The Changing Law of Nations:
Essays on International Law 59 (1968). See also Lador-Lederer, "Some
Observations on the 'Vienna School' in International Law," 57 Nether.
Int'l L. Rev. 126 (1970).
By the New Haven school, I refer to this group of scholars spread
throughout the nation who have self-consciously chosen to guide their
studies by applying the framework of inquiry originated by McDougal and
Lasswell. A point of departure for the New Haven school from its tra-
ditional counterparts can be traced back as far as the annual meeting
of the American Society of International Law of 1947, where Professor
McDougal, attending the Society's meetings for the first time, was
"Just a little shocked and disappointed':6 by what he heard at the meet-
ing. Before a group of established international lawyers who were dis-
cussing the codification of international law as a body of rules, he
said that he was moreinterested in bringing some of the best critical
thought from other social sciences to bear upon law.7 By way of intro-
ducing an alternative approach, he stressed the importance of studying
"how people use words," "how the human mind works," and "variables that
affect official behavior,"8 and to know "who is using these principles
of international law, these recognized doctrines, in what context, to
get what results, with respect to whom."9
In contrast with traditional schools of jurisprudence, the New Ha-
ven school takes into account, in its comprehensive analysis, many vari-
ables which affect the process of decision-making, other than "legal
norms." This school's full impact, particularly upon international law,
is beginning to be felt throughout the United States as its approach is
"transmitted by the rapid spread of [its] teaching in scores of univer-
sities across the country."10  In fact, no international lawyer can af-
ford to ignore the impact of the New Haven school and the contributions
it has made to the study of his subject. Throughout history it has not
been uncommon for great schools of thought to disappear over time as the
frequency and visibility of writings of their founders decrease, or the
creative individuals forming the core of the school disperse to other
endeavors. However, it can safely be said that the New Haven school
will continue to exist as a dynamic school of inquiry in a world of chang-
Ing environments: Professor W. Michael Reisman is assuming the same lea-
dership as McDougal and Lasswell, maintaining and stimulating the school's
6Remarks by McDougal, [1947] Proceedings Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 47.
7 Ibid.
8All quotations from Ibid.
91d. at 48.
1OGottlieb, supra note 4 at 203.
intellectual tradition.
Various comments and criticisms have been directed toward the New
Haven approach sometimes described as "a policy-oriented jurisprudence."1 1
Traditionalists have accused it of:
. . . fusing law and policy in a manner that threa-
tens to turn international law into a convenient in-
strument of national policy-as is the case in to-
talitarian countries, or as it is characterized by
the more radical exponents of Realvolitik; one that
approves of nationalist policies, provided that the
policy maker is on the "rightl side, i.e., an ex-
ponent of the values of 'human dignity," and the
state or group of states against whom such policy
is exercised is not.12
Works written along the lines of the New Haven approach have been referred
to as products of "a computer, 'fed' with such factors as skills, power,
enlightenment, value, well-being--each having the same magnitude-and 'pro-
grammed' to put every fact and concept in a predetermined place."1 3 The
approach has been characterized as "the magical Lasswellian categories
that are assumed of giving to whoever uses them whatever result he wants
to reach."14 Those who appear to have heard the story of "Law, Science,
and Policy," but, perhaps, never tried to come to terms with it, offer
the somewhat superficial criticis= that "L.S.P. is currently the juris-
prudential counterpart of L.S.D.: its effects on individuals vary from
exhilaration, to deep depression, to indifference and nobody is quite
sure to what extent it is habit-forming. There are some who would make
it the basis of a religion."15
1 The most comprehensive statement of the New Haven school to date
appears in McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, "Theories About International
Law: Prologue to A Configurative Jurisprudence," 8 Va. J. Int'l L. 188
(1968).
1 2Friedmam,"Book Review,'" 64 Colum. L. Rev. 606, 608 (1964).
13Fawcett, "Bookreview," [19631 Brit. T. B. Int'l L. 531, 532.
14Hoffmann, "International Law and the Control of Force," in The Rele-
vance of International Law 34, 46 (K. Deutsch & S. Hoffmarneds., 1968;
Anchor edn. 1971).
l5W. L. Twining, Pericles and the Plumber 25 (1967).
Possibly the most frequent criticism leveled against it is that "the
sheer labour of coping with [the New Haven approach's] terminology is
too oppressive."'16 Yet it cannot be said that the approach McDougal,
Lasswell, and Reisman recommend has received adequate critical examina-
tion. Of course the New Haven approach is maddening only to those who
do not want to understand it in the first place. It may be noted here
that ignorance is sometimes opportunistic and expedient. Like knowledge
which can be purposefully acquired, ignorance can also be purposefully
directed and perpetuated.1 7 Due to its strikingly revolutionary method
of analysis, much confusion and misunderstanding have inevitably been
borne in the course of evaluating this jurisprudence.1
8
16Bowett, "Book Review," [1962] Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. 517.
17Gunner Myrdal, An American Dilemma 40-42 (1944).
18Professor McDougal's approach, writes Professoi Richard A. Falk,
remains unacceptable to those within the realm of
power because his jurisprudence represents such a
radical challenge to established values. To make
policy explicit in periods of change and confron-
tation is to rob law of its mystifying potency.
Such an exposure generates subversive tendencies,
however unintentionally, that undermine fixed pat-
terns of respect thinking, feeling, and acting.
My point here is that Professor McDougal's work
if properly understood is the acme of policy expli-
cation and this almost necessarily has a radicalizing
impact that largely disqualifies its adherents from
serving the state in a mere professional capacity.
The policy voice remains audible in a manner that
challenges the division of labor and technicist ethos
which large-scale organizations, particularly govern-
meats and corporations, depend and insist upon. Mc-
Dougal's emphasis on policy analysis tends to produce
international lawyers who cannot be counted upon, and
who therefore are potentially dangerous presences
within the organizational structure.
Falk, "The Place of Policy in International Law," 2 Supp. 2 Ga. J. Int'l
& Comp. L. 29, 32 (1972). This assessment by Professor Falk, who as a
member of the "loyal opposition" critically contributes from within to
the improvement of the framework of inquiry, is convincingly demonstra-
ted in a recent article on nationality. In accordance with their clari-
As a point of departure, the New Haven approach establishes what may
be referred to as a teleological orientation toward the function of law
in a community. Lasswell and Kaplan in one principal book call their po-
sition "hominocentric politics," and define it: "As science, it finds its
subject matter in interpersonal relations, not abstract institutions or or-
ganizations; and it sees the person as a whole, in all his aspects, not as
the embodiment of this or that limited set of needs or interests. As po-
licy, it prizes not the glory of a depersonalized state or the efficiency
of a social mechanism, but human dignity and the realization of human ca-
fied policy of "the utmost voluntarism in affiliation, participation, and
movement, with an easy assumption of states of a competence to protest
such individuals as seek their protection," McDougal, Lasswell and Chen
recommend a community policy for decision which reads in part:
Save for conflict with the most urgent state necessities,
people ought thus to be allowed freely to determine
their nationality subsequent to birth. Their wishes
should be made largely the decisive factor, with only
a modest deference toward criteria designed to protect
state interests. In support of these policies proce-
dures for establishing and withdrawing nationality
should not be honored when they are so arbitrary as
to hegate whatever proteztion may otherwise be pro-
vided for the individual. Requirements for estab-
lishing and providing nationality need not, in order
to preclude fraud, be so strict as to make compliance
Impossible. For the further protection of private
.choice, comparable policies might be recognized for
the withdrawal of nationality. States should not be
permitted arbitrarily (as for purposes of discrimina-
tion or punishment) to withdraw nationality, nor ar-
bitrarily to preclude voluntary change of nationality.
Statelessness should, by some one of many expedients,
be abolished.
McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, "Nationality and Human Rights: The Protection
of the Individual in External Arenas," 83 Yale L. J. 900, 903, 905 (1974).
And in keeping with the goal of human dignity, the authors conclude, "na-
tionality must be made to serve the development and happiness of human
beings, and not to perpetuate human bondage by anchoring people, against
their will, in a particular territorial community or alternatively casting
them adrift when it is withdrawn." Id. at 998. Given the characteristic
pacities."'19 McDougal applies the policy science espoused by Lasswell
to the study of international law. Thus, he challenges "widely accep-
ted notions,"2 0 causing "uneasiness among some skeptical professional
colleagues,"21 and complaints of his "highly esoteric private language." 
22
nature of "nationality" as "the paramount interests of state elites in
the control of people as important bases of power" their recommendations
will tremendously diminish the exclusive power and control of btate elites.
These recommendations include: (1) that individuals be authorized to pro-
tect themselves; (2) that the individual be allowed to freely associate
himself with a state by withdrawing his old nationality and choosing a
new one; (3) that the protection of nationality by some organized in-
ternational body be given to the individual on the global level, inclu-
ding the establishment of a group of "United Nations citizenship." Id.
at 993-995. These radical recommendations, which by state elites may
regard as "subversive", are made possible only when the observer commits
himself, as the authors do, to the values of human dignity as his clarn-
"fied policy and go beyond the nation-state system.
19Lasswell & Kaplan, Power and Society xxiv (1950).
20Dillard, "The Policy-Oriented Approach to Law," 40 Va. Q. Rev. 625
(1964).
21Ibid.
22Fitzmaurice, "Vae Victis, Or Woe to the Negotiators! Your Treaty
or Our 'Interpretation' of It?" 65 Am. J. Int'l L. 358, 360 (1971). The
most common and typical criticism is directed against the specialized ter-
minology of the New Haven school. See, e.g., Fawcett, Book Review [1963]
34 Brit. Y. B. int'l L. 531, 532: "its weakness lies in the verbiage it
generates and in the avoidance of familiar terms where they would do:
for example, 'wealth deprivation' and even more unexpected 'rectitude'
seem no good substitutes for 'damage' and 'choice of values'." Another
Englishman commented: "No doubt the question has already been asked
whether in final analysis, the Yale approach will have done a disservice
to American legal scholarship, in the sense that many worthwhile works
will achieve less impact in the world at large because people will not
read them, or, if they do, fail to find the analysis and approach help-
ful. It would be a pity if scholars were deterred from reading this."
Bowett, Book Review, 22 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 401 (1973). Compare these
observations with Gunnar Myrdal's growingdisrespect for "traditionally
rigid boundary lines between separate disciplines of social sciences as
they have developed pragamatically to fit teaching purposes and to meet
the need for specialization." Profcssor Myrdal states:
Professor Richard A. Falk of Princeton calls McDougal's theory-"danger-
Cus knowledge".
His enterprise to create a world public order based
on the values of human dignity is a radical world
order vision of prime magnitude. It is universal
in scope (that is, the conception is non-hierarchi-
cal, and is even susceptible of taking an anti-govern-
mental twist); it is process-oriented in relation to
the future (that is, we create the future by promot-
ing preferred values in all critical arenas, starting
now); it is oriented toward the well being of the
species as a whole and is thus naturally receptive
to both an ecological perspective and a futurist
concern with assuring the life-chances of subse-
quent generations.23
McDougal's efforts to reformulate the relevance of law to human affairs
on a global level is "dangerous," because, continues Falk, "it threatens
the prevailing paradigm, and hence draws fire from certain kinds of pro-
fessionals who continue to believe in (the traditional nation-state sys-
tem] .,,24
The rationale for this disrespect was my growing re-
cognition of the fact that in reality there are not
economic, sociological, or psychological problems,
but simply problems, and that as a rule they are com-
plex. The one and only type of concept that it is
permissible to keep vague is the meaning of terms
such as economics, sociology, psychology, or history
since no scientific inference can ever depend on
their definitions. This point, as we know, is not
always acknowledged even today but was admitted still
less than forty years ago. In those days labor was
often wasted on finding the precise definition of one
or another of our several social sicence disciplines
ln the belief that this was an important activity.
Hyrdal, Objectivity in Social Research 10-11 (1969). Emphasis original.
23R. A. Falk, The SherrillLectures delivered at the Yale Law School, 1974.
24 Id. at 67.
In his recent article, "Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres
McDougal and Harold Lasswell,"25 Professor John Norton Moore of Virginh
has provided us with an introduction to the New Haven approach. Hence,
at the risk of recapitulating what Professor Moore has already explained
in that article, I intend, nevertheless, to offer an introduction to ba-
sic ideas prevading the New Haven school of Jurisprudence. By basic ideas,
I refer to some of the intellectual underpinnings upon which the New Ha-
ven school is founded. As a student of the New Haven school, through
this essay I invite readers into the gateway of the New Haven school,
and offer a small guidebook and map for the further study of it.
26 It
is hoped that the exposition of some of the concepts underlying a policy-
oriented approach may help readers through some of the complexities of
the New Haven school.
II. The Myth of Objectivity
The New Haven approach requires that the observer, at the outset,
appreciates that he cannot be a wholly objective analysist of the com-
munity process he examines as he is both a product of and a participant
in that very process.27
25Moore, "Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and
Harold Lasswell," 54 Va. L. Rev. 662 (1968).
26A biographical sketch of the development of the New Haven school
is provided by Tipson, "The Lasswell-McDougal Enterprise: Toward a World
Public Order of Human Dignity," 14 Va. J. Int'l L. 535 (1974).
27"It is well known that the technique of analyzing definitions and
criticizing propositional statements does not enable the ego to obtain
access to 'inconscious'. The conscious process itself may be under the
domination of repetitive compulsions which are outside the awareness of
the thinker. If rationality includes the notion of freedom of choice
and hence of freedom from obsession and compulsivity, it is obvious that
rational thinking requires the use of appropriate procedures by means of
which the thinker obtains access to pertinent facts about the self."
Lasswell, "Clarifying Value Judgment: Principles of Content and Proce-
dure," 1 Inquiry 87, 92 (1958).
An environment in which the observer finds himself reflects itself
through his perspectives and attitudes; his standards of behavior have
been fashioned-by continuing socialization within members of his groups
and his reference to non-group members.28 A family is a primary group
in the sense that how his family socialized the observer bears a signi-
ficant effect upon his attitudes and perspectives.2 9 The extent to which
he is bound by religion, traditions, and customs of the immediate commu-
nity in whih he lives shapes his subjectivity. Beyond such a primary
environment, he has been exposed to a larger environment: the level of
education he has acquired, the range of associations he has affiliated
with, and so on.
These environmental variables contribute to shaping the observer's
predisposition through time. Accumulated predispositions, in turn, can
determine how he will select and affect his group associations and lar-
ger environment.
The predispositional variables can be most conveniently described
in terms of: 1. The identifications the observer establishes in his
relation to other individuals and groups; 2. His demands for prefer-
red interests, including those of pursuing an inquiry; and 3. Expecta-
tions about his own losses or gains.
1. Identifications: whac the observer identifies himself
with may vary in scope and intensity: he can identify strongly as well
as exclusively with a particular class or any of kinship, ethnic, func-
tional or professional groups. However, such identifications caa be
more inclusive without jeopardizing primary identity.30 In fact, an
28Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 281ff (Rev'd
& enl'ed edn., 1957).
29Herbert H. Hyman, Political Socialization: A Study in the Psy-
chology of Political Behavior 51-66 (1959).
30See Lasswell, "Future Systen.s of Identity in the World Community,"
in 4 Cyril E. Black & Richard A. Falk (eds.), The Future of the Interna-
tional Legal Order 3 (1972). Professor Lasswell asks "whether a sense
of political identity comparable to nationalism is.developing or can de-
velop in support of a world-inclusive system of public order." Id. at
4. "The paradigm of an enlarging identity system in a group is the per-
identity is one's personal psychological association with other indivi-
duals or groups according to the intenstiy and scope of one's own in-
terests. This identity is critical in assuming any role in a community.
If the observer identifies with decision-makers and acts as a decision-
maker, his framework of inquiry may be of very limited significance.
2. Demands: What the observer seeks to achieve is closely
related to his identifications as in most cases his objectives are for-
mulated in the interests of individuals or groups with which he identi-
fies. State elites, for example, continuously strive to implement poli-
cies which will sustain them in power. The advocate attempts to win a
case for his client, thus improving his own skill and reputation. The
scholarly observer's principal scope value is enlightenment gathering,
and processing information, and disseminating and promoting knowledge.
When the observer learns that state elites do not subscribe to clari-
fied general community policies, he may seek to promote these policies,
and thus to change the elites' perspectives.
3. Expectations: Matter-of-fact perceptions of the observer's
past and present experiences and future expectations about the conse-
quences of what he is or will be doing may affect his attitudes toward
the problem he is concerned with. In some circumstances expectations
concerning his loses or gains may perforce unavoidably compel him to
change his identification and demands. The attraction of an increase
in power, wealth, or respect may lure him to forsake his responsibility
as a member of the larger community of mankind.3 1
ception of a common threat of value deprivation and of possible joint
action to prevent loss or even to obtain value gains. A shared field
of attention thus generates a map of expectation." Id. at 7.
31Consider, for example, judges of a domestic court before which a
claim was lodged against a new de facto regime after the coup. Their
attitudes toward the coup, their expectations in particular, about both
the outcome of the coup and the value position to be affected by the de-
cision they are going to make, tremendously affect the direction of events.
In most cases, as in Rhodesia's Madzimbamnuto v. Lardner-Burke N.O., domes-
tic judges sitting in the midst of a constitutional crisis choose to res-
cue their values first by a putative declaration of independence from the
coup regime, thus allowing the regime to consolidate its control and by
disguising "their choice with a spuzious legal respectability by garbing
it in the philosophical reasoning of Kelsen." Palley, "Rethinking the
Judicial Role: The Judiciary and Good Government," 1 Zambia L. J. 1, 8
(1969). For detailed exposition of correlations between decisions after
the coup and Judges' perspectives, see Palley, "The Judicial Process:
Social inquiry catnot proceed wholly free from bias--from the bias
of those who conduct the inquiry and of those who appreciate its outcome.
Objectivity cannot be achieved by simply collecting facts and presuming
that they speak for themselves. Facts are not evens; they are often the
conclusions the observer has drawn from observing events. How the obser-
ver collects the facts necessary for his inquiry and how he establishes
the causal relationship among them cannot be answered without some pre-
conceptions as to the events he is observing and the goals he seeks.
3 2
11. Standpoints of the Observer and of the Decision-Maker
Although the New Haven school distinguishes the role of the decision-
maker and that of the scholarly observer, it recognizes their interrela-tionship.3 3 Kelsen, as we will discuss below,3 distinguished the sci-
entific interpretation of the law from the political interpretation of
the law. The former, according to him, is done by a legal scientist and
.the latter by an official of state. With this distinction, Kelsen cug-
gests that a legal scientist reject the choice between alternatives of
Interpretation of a legal norm unless the choice is guided by its higher
U.D.I. and the Southern Rhodesian Judiciary," 30 Mo. L. Rev. 263, 269-
271. In particular, biographical sketches of each judge in Rhodesia's
case were explored in id. at 265-268.
3 2
"Facts do not organize themselves into concepts and theories just
by being looked at; indeed, except, within the framework of concepts and
theories, there are no scientific facts but only chaos. There is an in-
escapable a priori element in all scientific work. Questions must be
asked before answers can be given." G. Myrdal, The Political Element
In Development of Economic Theory, Preface to the English edition,-at
ix-xvi (1965). See also Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Intro-
duction to the Sociology of Knowledge 5 (1936).
33Lasswell & McDougal, "Criteria for a Theory About Law," 44 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 362, 379-382 (1971).
34See pp. 41-2 infra.
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norm. In contrast, McDougal suggests that a choice be made between these
alternatives according to policies projected in the legal norm in question
and to the perspectives of people living in the changing conditions of eco-
nomic, social, and political structure. He further maintains that this is
the legal scientist's task which should not be left entirely in the hands
of state officials. Since the legal scientist has responsible expertise
to interpret and clarify basic community policies embodied in legal norms
and procedures, and since he has frequent opportunities to observe such
legal norms and procedures in action, he must act to promote the basic
goal and purpose he recommends to the community.
This scholarly task of making the choice has to be performed by es-
tablishing an observational standpoint in the course of inquiry. With-
out this disengaged and observational standpoint, the scholar's choice
-will ba no different from that of the actual decision-maker or the claimant
who demands remedies invoking a particular legal norm. A critical need
for establishing the observer's standpoint is that the role of the scho-
larly observer and that of the decision-maker are distinguishable and
their functions are different from one another. The scholar is primarily
interested in acquiring knowledge and in understanding the aggregate in-
terrelationships of authoritative decisions and their effects upon vari-
ous sectors of a community;3 6 whilst the decision-maker is primarily in-
:)Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law 118 (1967); idem, The General
Theory of Law and State 31-32 (1945, 1961). See also Harris, "When and
Why Does the Grundnorm Change?" 29 Camb. L. J. 103 (1971). Kelsqn's theory
about Grundnorm has still contributed to the most dangerous "legitimati-
zation" of effective control by mere invocation of change in the basic
norm. It is curious to assert that Kelsen's theory being "pure" and "a-
political," licensed "the judges in the revolution cases . . . to accept
the legality of the successful revolutions concerning in their respective
countries, without entering the political arena." Farris, supra, at 104.
This attitude is a sheer submission to controlling events regardless of
their direction, thus making the submission unavoidably political. Cf.
Palley's conclusion: "Politically the decision assists the regime."
Palley, "The Judicial Process," note 25 supra, at 286-287.
3 6HcDougal, Lasswell, & Reisman, "Theories About International Law:
Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence," 8 Va. J. Int'l L. 188, 199
(1968).
terested in making effective choices which he enforces in order-to main-
tain a preferred social order of the community.37 Therefore, when Pro-
fessor Haas asserts that values of human dignity, which the New Haven
school recommended for commitment, are not subscribed to by state offi-
cials throughout the globe and that they are "the utopia cherised by
authors,"'38 he fails to establish an observational standpoint indepen-
dent of the state officials' perspective. The enlightenment function,
which the scholarly observer undertakes, should not merely offer an ex-
planation of what goes on in reality for its own sake,39 but should in-
clude policy recommendations reached by systematic and disciplined analy-
sis to promote goal values. Thus, the New Haven school recognizes the
Influence the scholarly observer can exercise. Professor Haas has sim-
ply relinquished an opportunity to enlighten state elites and change their
views.4 0 While decision-makers need the knowledge and understanding which
scholars offer in order to reach rational decisions, the scholar who is
himself a participant in the social process which he observes, often un-
avoidably and sometimes deliberatelv performs the role of decision-maker
In the information-gathering and promotion. This decision-making role
about inquiry is unavoidable because "data comes to us only in answer
to questions, and it is we who decide not only whether to ask but also
how the question is to be put.",41 Furthermore, as a responsible citi-
zen and a moral person, the scholar has his oun values and whatever he
selects, he selects for a reason which is related to his own preferen-
ces and goals. This is quite natural insofar as he is a human being.
Yet, the fact that a scientist has reasons for his choice of problems
other than a thirst for knowledge or a love of truth scarcely makes his
3 71Ibid.
38Ernst B. Haas, Human Rights and International Action: The Case
of Freedom of Association 131-132 (1971).
39Stanley Hoffmann, Contemporary Theories in International Relations
10 (1960).
40Cf. Robert Lynd, Knowledge for What? (1939), and Karl Mannhelm,
Man and Society (1940).
41
Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry 385 (1964). See also I
G. Myrdal, Asian Drama 24-26 (1968).
conduct of inquiry biased thereby.42  In the course of inquiry into the
world power process scientific interests need not exclude the interests
of policy. Rather, the New Haven school explicitly assumes both a role
"serving as a means of self-orientation in a flow of events of changing
significance '43 and "an instrumental role in implementing policy,'4 4 and
claims to be a policy science that clarifies the process of decision-ma-
king in the world community and offers intelligence and materials neces-
sary for rational decision about policy Issues. Thus, the scholarly ob-
server concerned with the appraisal of the world power process should es-
tablish the bases for his appraisal as explicitly as possible, thereby
enabling other observers to evaluate what he observes. As Gunnar Myr-
dal said, "the attempt to eradicate biases by trying to keep out the
valuations themselves is a hopeless and misdirected venture. . . . There
is no other device for excluding biases in social sciences than to face
the valuations and to introduce them as explicitly stated, specific, and
sufficiently concretized value premises,"4 5 because "science becooes no
better protected against biases by the entirely negative device of refu-
sing to arrange its results for practical and political utilization."46
This unavoidable service which science, particularly the social sciences,
renders to policy implementation makes it imperative that the scholary
observer distinguishes the "manipulative" from the "contemplative" stand-
point.4 7 But at the same time he recognizes that these two standpoints
are not antithetical to one another. This is why McDougal calls for a
distinction between theories of law and theories about law.48 The for-
42Kaplan, supra note 35, at 381-2; Myrdal, supra note 16 at 51.
43Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society xi (1951).
44Ibid.
45G. Myrdal, "Methodological Note on Facts and Valuations in Social
Science" in his An American Dilemma 1027, 1043 (1944).
46Id. at 1041.
4 7 Lasswefl & Kaplan, supra note 43 at xi-xii.
48McDougal, "Some Basic Theoretical Concepts About International
Law: A Policy-Oriented Framework of Inquiry," 4 J. Conflict Res. 337-
354 (1960).
mer are employed by decision-makers, participating in the processes of au-
thoritative and effective power, as they make and justify choices between
alternative courses of action in implementing community policies so as to
maximize values. Theories about law refer to these theories which will
facilitate successful performance of the relevant intellectual tasks. By
keeping clearly in mind the distinction between these standpoints, the
scholarly observer can establish his own observational standpoint, which
is fundamentally different from that of the active decision-maker. The
failure to appreciate this distinction and the difference the decision-
maker's and the scholarly observer's function as well as the interrela-
tions between them results in the complacent assertions that the scholar's
"primary duty . . . is to seek knowledge and understanding for their own
sake'49 and that science used to achieve "a set of recipes for action,
as systematic advice on statement"50 is "nothing other than a prostitution
of the scientific intelligence."51
IV. Delimitation of the Problem
A. The Relation of Law to Social Process
The New Haven school's conceptual framework for inquiry starts with
the establishment of a clear focus of inquiry. It demands that one com-
mences by stating which issues need clarification necessary for a more
viable solution. We are not living in a "human vacuum" isolated from
other communities, nor does law exist on paper independent of human in-
volvements. Thus, among the most significant features of the-New Faven-
school are its positive and realistic conception of the world community
and the link of law to the process of the shaping and sharing of values
in the world community. Judge Dillard, of the I. C. J., who shares many
ntellectual affinities with the New Haven school, has written:
5 2
4 9Hoffmann, supra note 39 at 10.
50 Id. at 8.
51Kaplan, supra note 43 at 393.
52Dillard, supra note 20 at 629. See also Judge Dillard's separate
.opinion in Namibia where he emphasizes that "No single, absolute meaning
can be attached to the word or concept of a 'dispute'. It must be con-
sidered in context and with reference to the purpose intended to be served
by [a particular prescription]." [1971] ICJ 154.
To ask, however tentatively, "What are rules?" is un-
wittingly to endow them with a kind of ceality or exis-
tence, even a metaphysical existence, which is illusory.
Rules of law do not "exist" in the sense in which a tree
or a stone or the planet Mars might be said to exist.
True, they may be articulated and put on paper and in
that form they exist, but, whatever their fozm, they
are expressed in words which are merely signs mediating
human subjectivities. They represent and arouse expec-
tations which are capable of being explored scientifi-
cally. The "law" is thus not a "something" impelling
obedience; it is a constantly evolving process of de-
cision making and the way it evolves will depend on
the knowledge and insights of the decision-makers.
So viewed, norms of law should be considered less as
compulsive commands than as tools of thoughts or in-
struments of analysis. Their impelling quality will
vary greatly depending on the context of application
and, since the need for stability is recognized, the
norms may frequently provide a high order of predic-
tability. But this is referable back to the expec-
tations entertained and is not attributable to some
existential quality attaching to the norms themselves.
-In other words, our concept of "law" needs to be li-
berated from the cramping assumption that it "exists"
as a kind of "entity" imposing restrictions on the de-
cision-maker.5 3
The focus of inquiry must accordingly be directed to a social process in
which people influence one another consciously or otherwise. A clear fo-
'cus is thus set on a process of interaction relating to particular problems
in question. The New Haven school speaks of "process" becausethere is an
on-going interaction among people through time. The term "process" con-
notes that this interaction is one of continual change in interrelation-
ships over a time period. We speak of "social" because the flesh-and-
blood living beings are participants in that process of interaction, and
we speak of "the world community" because the existence of the high fre-
quency of interaction and the intensity of interdependence on a global
scale causes the aggregate of people inhabiting this "shrunken globe" to
realize their common stake. The term "community" has very broad meanings
and is often defined loosely in daily conversation. When a group of peo-
53TIid.
pie who share both common perspectives and a sufficiently high frequency
of interaction among them is territorially based, it is appropriate to
call it "a community."54  In any level of community from municipal through
regional to global, people seek to broaden their identifications, expec-
tations, and demands about values in both organized and unorganized ways
transcending national territorial boundaries since they have become in-
creasingly aware that the conditions under which these values can be se-
cured are rapidly transcending the artificial man-made lines inherited
from the arbitrary confines of feudalism. Interdependence on a global
scale demonstrates the presence of the world community.55 The explicit
perception of the world community is found in all McDougal's writings.
His recent article with Professor W. Michael Reisman supporting the law-56
fulness of the United Nations action against Rhodesia is a good example.
Criticizing the contention that "whatever the Rhodesians have done has
been-wholly within their own country"5 7 and, consequently, is insulated
from international concern, and it affects nobody else, they argue that:
In the contemporary intensely interdependent world,
peoples interact not merely through the modalities
of collaborative or combative operations but also
through shared subjectivities--not merely through
the physical movements of goods and services or
exercises with armaments, but also through commu-
nications in which they simply take each other in-
to account. The peoples in one tezritorial commu-
nity may realistically regard themselves as being
affected by activities in another territorial com-
5 4 There exist communities at various levels of intensity from a
small hamlet through a city to a body politic and beyond. The level of
community can be defined according to the range of value effects result-
ing from a given social interaction. See T. Parson-, The Social System
91 (1951); Robert Maclver, Community: A Sociological Study 22-30 (1936,
3rd edn). See generally Carl J. Friedrich (ed.), Community (Nomos II,
1959).
55For the relevancy of the world community, see McDougal, Lasswell
& Reisman, supra note 36, at 189-195; Wilfred Jenks, Law in the World
Community (1967).
56
McDougal & Reisman, "Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Law-
fulness of International Concern," 62 Am. J. Int'l L. 1 (1966).
57Acheson, The Washington Post, Dec. 11, 1966, at E6:5-6.
munity, though no goods or people cross any'boun-
daries. Much more important than the physical move-
ments are the communications which people~make each
other.58
To describe the world social process or any level of process, the New
Haven school adopts the following scheme:
Man (actor, participant) acts to optimize values (pre-
ferred events) through institutions affecting resour-
ces.
59
This formula is called a maximization postulate. The term "values" is
used here without any of the metaphysical or other connotations it may
have in ordinary language.
Peoples in the world community both make demands and become subjec-
ted to counter-demands while trying to maximize all or certain values at
their disposal in relation to other participants in the world social pro-
cess. Eight value-institution categories are used to analyze this pro-
cess:
-Power: the giving and receiving of support
in government, politics, and law;
Wealth: the production and distribution of
goods and services, and consumption;
Enlightenment: the gathering, processing, and dis-
semination of information;
Skill: opportunity to acquire and exercise
capability in vocation, professions,
and other social activities;
Well-being: safety, health, and comfort;
Affection: intimacy, friendship, and loyalty;
5
"cDougal & Reisman, supra note 56 at 12.
59See generally Lasswell and Kaplan, supra note 43.
Respect: recognition, whether personal or
ascriptive;
Rectitude: participation in forming and apply-
ing norms of responsible conduct.6 0
This Is a representative and not an exhaustive list. These eight
categories are not ranked in order of importance in any culture; we assume
that the relative position of value varies with respect to subjectivities,
time, and culture.
Law is a product of and an instrument in the social process in which
people seek their preferred events. These groups of preferred events en-
able the observer to describe social realtiy more specifically and systema-
tically than does a simple descriptive fiat of the term "social. reality."61
When these value-institution categories or their equivalents are used to
analyze any social process, they can be more specific in any degree de-
sired.
The description of events taking place in a particular community in
reference to the most comprehensive community of mankind facilitates the
clarification of problems in question. The interaction among participants
In a social process culminates at a certain point in time and space in
specific events where participants lose or gain what they perceive as pre-
ferred interests. Such a culmination of events involving losses and gains
is called "outcomes," the sequence of which can be differentiated in terms
of pre-outcome, outcome, and post-outcome phases. The description of what
Is happening in the world can be most appropriately broken down into a
series of questions:
1. Who participated in a particular process of inter-
action of varying degree? (Participants)
2. What are the significant perspectives of the par-
ticipants? Their identification pattern? What
are their value demands? flow do they perceive con-
ditions under which their value demands will be
realized? (Perspectives)
60 i
McDougal has written that "Any derivations by others which support
our postulated goals are regarded as acceptable." McDougal, s note 48
at 343. But see Falk, Book Review, 8 Natural L. Rev. 171 (1963).
61See Lasswell & Kaplan 56-73, and passim.
3. Where and under what social conditions does inter-
action take place? (Situation)
4. What kind of effective means are at their disposal
In order to achieve their demands? (Base Values)
5. How do participants manipulate and manage their base
values to achieve their objectives? (Strategies)
6. What are the immediate results of the process of in-
teraction? (Outcomes)
7. What are the long term effects of the outcome and
process? (Effects)
This is what is called the phase analysis. Some indication may be given
to the range of possible responses to such questions.
1. Participants
Various individuals and groups participate in a social process. In
transaational relations, states, represented by state officials, are still
predominant participants. The term "state" is an authoritative symbol ac-
corded to "a-body politic," which is a territorially based, highly organi-
zed political group. But our principal focus is not so much on institu-
tions or the structures of authority as on actual decision-makers who make
decisions with authority and control. When one speaks of a state, one is
in fact dealing with a group of effective elites which represents it as
"a government."
2. Perspectives
Unlike legal fiction, the state, the effective elites who represent
it, have their own human psychology and perspectives. A participant in
any social interaction frequently uses the word or a set of words to re-
fer to himself as an individual or as a member of a group. Words like
"I," 'we," "you," and "they," are symbols of the identification system.
Identification is whatever the ego identifies with. People differentiate
themselves from other people by using these symbols. The pattern of iden-
tification may vary depending upon what one is seeking to achieve.
Participants in a social process seek to maximize certain values.
When these values are pursued as ends in themselves, they are termed
scope values, distinguished from base values when they are managed as
a base resource for acquiring other values. Parcicipants make demands
for various values with certhin ideas of conditions under which these values
will be achieved. These conditions are expectations. They are matter-
of-fact references about individuals' past and present experiences and
future references. Thus, expectations are subjective perceptions about
events.
3. Situations
Situations refer to the time and space in which interactions take
place and can be divided into four:
Geographical features: the geographical areas of inter-
action and the scope of effects stemming from particular in-
teractions. The recent coup in Cyprus demonstrated that the
spatial location of a particular event critically affects its
outcome.62
Time features: The duration and periodicity of interac-
tion.
Institutionalization: The degree of organization of si-
tuations in which interactions take place. Institutionaliza-
tion may refer to a particular pattern of interaction which
may be open or closed, and centralized or decentralized.
Crisis level: The crisis features of interaction may
exhibit differing degrees in intensity of expectations. A
particular level of crisis may be decisive in lawfully sus-
pending public order, in that the derogation from established
community standards is permissible only where necessary to
protect community values.63
62From the perspective of effective decision-makers, the locus of
an operation is sometimes determinative in molding reciprocal tolerance
among effective global elites who control what is called "spheres of in-
fluence." See Falk, "Introduction," in idem (ed.), The International Law
of Civil War 14-16 (1971). Friedman',"Intervention and International
Law I," in Louis G. M. Jaquet (ed.), Intervention in International Poli-
tics 40, 42-43 (1971).
63 Complementary formulations, framed at many different
levels of abstraction, are indispensable both to ex-
press-the whole range of fundamental demands and ex-
4. Base Values
Base values include all values available to a participant in order
to seek scope values. A successful lawyer, for example, who has special
skill (in logic, adversary tactics) and enlightenment (in law and public
policies) thus acquires respect and wealth, may have a good chance to seek
power through the affection of his influential friends. How he manages
and manipulates these values is conditioned by individual and professional
rectitude.
5. Strategies
Strategies are the effective management and manipulation of base
values to create desirable value outcomes. Strategies are two-fold:
a modality and an instrument. A modality can be coercive when value
demands communicated to respondents do not leave a wide range of options
from which the respondent can choose. A modality is persuasive when re--
spondents have freedom to choose what they prefer most.
Instruuents of policy are of four types. Inter-elite communications
are termed diplomatic since the target of communications is specific and
there are direct interactions between the communicator and the communica-
tee. Ccmmunications become ideological when the audience of communica-
tions 13 masses of people. The management and manipulation of goods and
services are an economic strategy, while the deployment and threat of force
-is a military strategy. These four strategies are constantly used to
create varying degrees of value effects. Any use of strategy cannot be
classified dichotomously into war and peace; the level of coercion is a
continuum in degress ranging from the maximum persuasion to the maximum
pectations and to make tentative identifications of the
different factual contexts in which different distribu-
tions of values are demanded and expected. The immense
flow of prescriptions does in fact cover every phase of
human interaction and all demanded values--civil, poli-
tical, social, economic, cultural, and other--and in
many particular instances of interaction such values
must be in fact competitive, requiring choices among
alternative prescriptions--or alternative interpreta-
tions of particular prescriptions-and protected values.
The necessities and potentialities of this complemen-
tarity are explicitly recognized in many of the human
rights prescriptions in the form of requirements, first,
for the accommodation of particular human rights with
other human rights and the aggregate common interest,
and second, of permissible derogations from some humaa
rights in times of high crisis and intense threat to
aggregate community interest.
coercion.64 The different use of instruments creates differing degrees
of persuasion and coercion.
Outcomes are the immcdiate results of interaction in the form of
value deprivations or value indulgences. Deprivations are the actual
loss of values or the blocked gains. Indulgences are actual gains or
the blocked loss.
The immediate result of any interaction may have long term effects
not only on the locality of the immediate interaction, but on the public
order of the world.
This process of social interaction can be specifically described with
regard to a particular problem with which one is concerned. Participants
make claims demanding that authoritative decisions be made to solve their
controvercies stemming from the process of interaction. Claims consist
of facts, value demands, and policies as entertained by a particular
claimant. Claims are not necessarily those claims brought by claimants
before some formally organized institutions, such as a court or tribunal,
where claims are clearly formulated. But in arenas of a low degree of
organization, as Professor Reisman writes, "subjectivities are often
modulated by indirect communication. It is the investigator who must
Infer claims from behavior and formulate them verbally. This -exercise
necessarily requires an examination of events in the most comprehensive
context and the use of inference devices not conventionally employed by
the law."65 In short, we speak of claims when "events" taking place in
McDougal, "Human Rights and World Public Order: Principles of Content
and Procedure for Clarifying General Community Policies," 14 Va. J. Int'l
L. 387, 390 (1974). Compare Article 29 with Article 30 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. A similar comparison may be made between
Article 21 and Article 22 of the International Covenant on Political and
Civil Rights. These two conventions and other important prescriptions on
human rights may be found in I. Brownlie, Basic Documents on Human Rights
(1971).
64Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World
Public Order 1-39 (1961).
65W. Michael Reisman, Nullity and Revision: The Review of Enforce-
ment of International Judgments and Awards 145 (1971).
a given situation demand the attention of authoritative decision-makers.
Particular problems about claims are also clarified in the phase analy-
sis. Thus, we speak of the process of claims in terms of claimants, ob-
jectives, situations, and so on. The types of claims are, in effect, the
summary statement of claims, to which authoritative decision-makers must
respond. The detailed analyses of claims are presented in the trend stu-
dies section.6
6
When claims are made, decision-makers must respond in order to solve
the issues involved in them. How such responses are made is described
in the process of authoritative decision.67 A clear focus on the deci-
sion process is facilitated by using phase analysis as in social process.
The label "participants" found in the analysis of the social process chan-
ges to "authoritative decision-makers" in analysis of the process of de-
cision.68 It is important to note that in the still highly decentralized
contempnzary world, participants, particularly state officials, play a dual
function as both claimants and as authoritative decision-makers in various
contexts. This characteristic feature is called a d6doublemont fonction-
nel.69
Authoritative decision-makers include all participants in the afore-
mentioned social process, although the degree of their participation in
the decision-making process may change in varying degrees of consequen-
tiality, depending upon their perspectives, where decision is made, the
bases of power available to them and strategies they can use. In de-
66Compare the explanation developed herein with McDougal, Lasawell
& Vlasic, The Public Order of the Space. The process of social interac-
tion as it pertains to earth-space events is developed in id. at 3-88.
The process of claims is described at 85-94. As for the types of claims,
compare the enumeration of claims at 90-93 with Trends in Decision at
193ff. The same headings may be found regarding claims.
67Id. at 94-137.
68Compare id. at 3 with id. at 96.
69See Scelle, "Le Phenomene Juridique du d6doublement fonctionnel,"
in Schftzel and Schlochauser, Rechtsfragen der Internationalen Organisa-
tion: Festschrift fur Hans Wehberg 324 (1956). For a critique of the
doctrine, see Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International
Law 148 (1964).
scribing the process of decision, the label "arena" is used in place of
"situation," for decision-making is a function of power. Thus, it is not
an error, as one reviewer has suggested, 70 that the word "situation" is
used in one place and the word "arena" in another within a similar phase
analysis. Possibly the reviewer failed to appreciate that the processes
of interaction and of decision are distinctive.
Hence, "base values" is replaced by "bases of power",71 which can be
divided into "authority" and "control" or effective values. Authority,
according to Reisman, is
a set of conditioned subjectivities shared by relevant
members of a group; when operative, when tripped so to
speak, by outside events, these subjectivities provide
the individuals concerned with an indication of appro-
priate behavior. Authority can be considered a signi-
ficant determinant of individual or group behavior, not
necessarily when it compcis a certain course, but when
it indicates that course with a degree of clarity suf-
ficient to excite internal tension or psychic dysphoria
if an incompatible course is followed.
72
Control, on the other hand, entails effective values at the disposal of
decision-ma'.ers. It refers to "resources that can be employed to secure
a desired pattern of behavior in others."73 Thus, Reisman adds: "Control
can $e used indulgently or deprivationally. it can be employed in conjunc-
tion and conformity with authority or without regard to the authority per-
spectives of the manipulators or manipulated."74 These two components of
power are integral to one another for insuring the enforceability of any
decision. Decision devoid of authority is no more than a manifestation
of naked power; without control, decision is merely a pretended authority.
70Ramazanti, "International Legal Order: Projections and Develop-
ments, 11 Va. J. Int'l L. 152, 154 (1970). See McDougal, Lasswell & Vla-
sic, supra note 66 at 103.
'72 cDougal, Lasswell & Vlasic, supra note 66 at 105.




Any decision creates effects on various levels of community. A de-
cision made within the decision structure of a given community may affect
other larger community processes beyond the original realm of decision.
To be effective, any decision must be related to a larger community pro-
cess.
B. Law as Comprehensive Process of Decision in a Community.
The New Haven school does not describe the world's different coumu-
nity decision processes through a dichotomy of national and international
law, in terms of the relative supremacy of one system of rules or ofher
interrelations of rules. Instead, it describes them in terms of the in-
terpenetration of multiple processes of authoritative decision of varying
territorial compass. 75 The focus of inquiry into the interpenetration of
the different community processes-of the world, from local through regional
to global, is "perspectives of authority," i.e., perspectives about who
should decide what, with respect to whom, for the promotion of what poli-
cies, by what method. Unlike traditional and conventional theories that
conceive of international law as a pre-existing set of rules for regula-
ting conduct, which are not significantly affected by the social processes
and particularly the power process, New Haven school regards law as an in-
strument affecting the power process-the process by which some people con-
trol others. Power is one of the valdes decision-makers pursue and exer-
cise. To have power is to be taken into account in other decisin-makArs'
policies. And the values decision-makers demand in order to pursue and
exercise power through their identification may be accumulated and be em-
ployed as bases of power to influence outcomes in particular interactions.
In this continuing process of power shaping and sharing, international law
is conceived as one of the instruments of power in that it is "an expres-
sion, not of arbitrary political fiat; but of the fundamental policies of
peoples. . . "76 Here, international law is mo"t realistically observed,
not as a mere rigid set of rules but as the whole process of authoritative
decision in which patterns of authority and patterns of control are appro-
priately conjoined. "Authority" means expectations of appropriateness as
75McDougal, "The Impact of International Law Upon National Law: A
Policy Oriented Perspective," 4 S. Dak. L. Rev. 265, 326 (1959).
76McDougal, "Dr. Schwarzenberger's Power Politics," 47 Am. J. Int'l
L. 115, 119 (1953).
to who is andowed with decision-making power, what objectives they are ex-
pected to pursue, what decision-making procedure they are required to follow
and what outcomes they should achieve. Thus, authroity is sought not in
some transempirical source of "obligation" or "validity" but empirically
in the genuine expectations of the people who constitute a given cormunity
about the requirements for lawful decision in that community.77 Control
means the making of the policy choices which are, in fact, put into effect
In consequential degree. Patterns of authority and patterns of control af-
fect each other, in that expectations as to the authoritativeness of conduct
may contribute to encouraging conformance to community expectations, i.e.,
stabilizing patterns of authority. Specifically, the New Haven school re-
gards international law as:
a comprehensive process of authoritative decision in which
rules are continuously made and remade; that the functions
of the rules of international law is to communicate the per-
spectives (demands, identifications, and expectations) of
the peoples of the world about this comprehensive process
of decision; and that the rational application of these
rules in particular instances requires their interpreta-
tion, like that of any other communication, in terms of
who is using them, with respect to whom, for what pur-
poses (major and minor), and in what context.78
Out of this comprehensive on-going process of authoritative and con-
trolling decision flow two types of decisions which determine the quality
of the public order the world community seeks to achieve. The first type,
those which establish, maintain, and re-establish the whole global process
of decision itself, are called the "constitutive" decisions.79 These guide
effective participants of the world community to identify who has authority
to make a particular decision, to clarify the basic community policies to
be pursued, to establish an appropriate authoritative structure so that de-
cision-makers may perform their functions, to allocate bases of power among
different decision-makers for sanctioning purposes, to authorize the appro-
77Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 27 at 384-385.
78McDougal, "A Footnote," 57 Am. J. Int'l L. 383 (1963).
79For elaboration, see McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, "The World Con-
stitutive Process of Authoritative Decision," 19 J. Leg. Ed. 253, 403 (1967).
Zeprinted in 1 Falk & Black (eds.); The Future of the International Legal
Order 73 (1969).
priate procedures for making decisions and to secure the continuous perfor-
mance of all kinds of decision functions indispensable to the realization
of community values embodied in law. This "constitutive" nature of deci-
sion is frequently neglected. A recent example par excellence is the Sab-
batino case80 in which the United States Supreme Court abdicated its ac-
tive role in the global process of constitutive decision by invoking a
distorted concept of "act of state".81 Traditionally, the court would
find it expedient to label the issue involving "constitutive decision" as
"political" and take up what it labels "legal" questions which it wishes
to decide. In reality, however, the court makes a real decision in both
instances as a decision not to decide is itself a decision.8 2 Non-deci-
sion inevitably involves value deprivations and indulgences, not to men-
tion its effect on the aggregate of expectations shared by effective par-
ticipants in the world community, and effects may be far-reaching, for
the constitutive process is itself maintained by the very expectations
of these participants. A realistic perception of the role of the court
as an authoritative decision-maker must include not only the app:ication
function, but also the prescriptive function. To establish the constitu-
tive process by which authoritative and controlling decisions are made
and applied and re-made, seven authority functions are required: intelli-
gence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination, and
appralsal.83 The use of these seven functions incorporated in the consti-
tutive process of authoritative decision helps clarify authoritative ex-
pectations with respect to international policies.
The second type of decisions are "public order" decisions as theY84
establish and maintain all features of value process protected by law.
The characteristic feature of public order stems from the constitutive
process. These public order decisions decide how to shape and share par-
ticular values of the community; how individuals or groups of individuals
80Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
8 1tee McDougal, "Act of State in Policy Perspective: The Interna-
tional Law of an International Economy," in Private Investors Abroad--
Structures and Safeguards 327 (1966).
82W. M. Reisman, supra note 65,at 625-634.
83See Harold D. Lasswell, The Decision Process: Seven Categories
of Functional Analysis (1956).
84McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman, supra note 36at 202-203.
can be protected in securing participation in the power processes; how
resources and wealth can be protected and shared; how the well-being of
individuals can be secured, and so on. The clarification between these
two types of decisions enables discussion to focus not so much on the
institutional structure of authority, the narrow obsession with "given
rules" and their application as on all relevant features of the process
by which decisions are made and applied and their effects on the commu-
nity. Decision is a decision-maker's response to events and it involves
sanctions in the form of deprivations or indulgence. The flow of authori-
tative and controlling decision is law.
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Claimants demand on decision-
makers for the solution of
their controversies.
(3) And by identifying which de-
cision-makers actually respond to claims
once they are lodged;
A clear focus on these three different, though interrelated, processes is
Indispensable for a comprehensive, but appropriately selected, inquiry.
This is the de]imitation of the problem. Scme critics Iall it the run-
down of the inventory and check-list.85 But for any responsible and de-
pendable inquiry, to delimit the focus of inquiry is not merely to check
all stones and to turn over each of them: the quality of inquiry depends
not only upon the depth of research but upon the width of research cover-
ing all relevant areas. The comprehensiveness of inquiry and the realis-
tic selectivity of the relevant factors critically affect both how parti-
cular problems should be formulated and how different, though interrula-
ted, intellectual tasks should be performed with dependability and real-
ism. The principle of economy is at work in selecting relevant factors
for inquiry, and economy can be achieved by performing relevant intellec-
tual tasks. In-fact, for any reliable investigative reporter, information
about 4H's-Who did Wnat, How, When, and Why-is a minimum requirement.
Without it, he cannot write even the first paragraph of a news account.
IV. Performance of Intellectual Tasks.
In delimiting the focus of inquiry regarding a particular problem,
the disengaged observer, whose perspective is that of a member of the
world community, should respond to that problem with a view to improving
that community. Any problem-oriented inquiry which contributes to ra-
tional decision must include the following five intellectual tasks: the
clarification of goals regarding a particular issue, the description of
past trends in decision regarding the issue, the analysis of conditions
affecting decision, the projection of future trends in decision, and the
invention and evaluation of policy alternatives.
1. Clarification of Community Policies.
For an inquiry into conditioning variables other than legal norms,
a prime point of departure of the New Haven school is its concept of "law,"
not as "norms formulated in words which decision-makers feel, or should
85For Professor Fisher of Harvard, more "useful ways of thinking
about the problems involved when one country takes action which another
may regard as 'intervention' [is] to suggest a few new general criteria
for decision than . . . to inventory and catalogue some of the almost li-
mitless factual variables. .. ." Fisher, "A Reply," in Burke, "The Le-
gal Regulation of Minor International Coercion: A Framework of Inquiry,"
in Roland J. Stanger (ed.), Essays on Intervention 87, 124n. (1964). In
a similar criticism Oran Young recently contended that the New Haven in-
tellectual apparatus "has failed to support the development of any theory
(or theories) in the formal sense. In fact, it tends to hinder the de-
velopment of theory severly by introducing excessive numbers of poten-
tially relevant factors." In Young's view, "the crucial problem in de-
veloping viable formal theories is to construct simple logical models
by stripping away as many factors as possible without undermining the
predictive accuracy of the resultant propositions." The "rigid formalism"
n] 1pedly inherent in the New Haven jurisprudence "frequently makes it
feel, impelled to obey,"86 but as factors and instruments in "guiding and
shaping decision"87 for the maximization of values. The study of law as
a facet of social science cannot be value-free. Social scientists con-
cerned with human conditions cannot avoid evaluation as to what ought to
be done about their subject matter.88 Contrary to Professor Wechsler's
assertion of "neutral principles"89 which transcend "any immediate re-
sult that is involved,"90 what is called for is not only consideration
of immediate consequences, but also intermediate and long range effects
of particular choices. Without the clarification of goal values, intel-
lectual tasks to evaluate such impact and effects will be subject to ar-
bitrariness and expediency. Accordingly, Wechsler implies the justifica-
tion of the reallocation of a particular ethnic group of United States citi-
zens on the ground of "a blessing to its victims, breaking down forever the
difficult to fit observations of the real world into the framework's ca-
tegorizations with any comfort." He thus complains that "The scheme tends
to encourage the proliferation of logically possible boxes or categories
that sometimes have little substantive content and that often become dif-
ficult to manage in analytic terms." All quotations are from Young, "In-
ternational Law and Social Science: The Contributions of Myres S. McDou-
gal," 66 Am. J. Int'l L. 60, 69 (1972).
Dilla'd, supra note 20 at 629.
87McDougal, "International Law, Power, and Policy: A Contemporary
Conception," 82 Recueil des Cours 133, 143 (1953).
In studying what is, we cannot totally rule out what
ought to be. In human life the motives and ends of
action are part of the process by which action is
achieved and are essential in seeking the relation of
the parts to the whole. Without the end most acts
would have no meaning and interest to us. But there
is, nevertheless, a difference between taking account
of ends and seeing ends. Whatever may be the possibi-
lity of complete detachment in dealing with physical
things, in sccial life we cannot afford to disregard
the values and goals of acts without missing the sig-
nificance of many of the facts involved. In our choice
of areas for research, in our selection of data, in our
method of investigation, in our organization of materials,
not to speak of the formuiation of our hypothesesand c~n-
clusions, there is always manifest some more 6r less
clear, explicit or implicit assumption or scheme of
evaltiation.
89Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law," 73
Harv. L. Rev. I (195c). The best and most devastating response to Wech-
sler's article is Miller and Howell, "The Myth of Neutrality in Consti-
tutional Adjudication," 27 U. Ch. L. Rev. 661 (1960).
ghettos in which they had previously lived."91  In effect, he seems to
argue that, transcending "immediate results," the Nazi persecution of
the Jews contributed to the creation of the State of Israel.
Biases and arbitrariness can be minimized only by explicitly clari-
fying goals and by disciplined and critical evaluation of their ultimate
effects on the condition of man. McDougal has stated:
The essence of a reasoned decision by the authori-
ty of the secular values of a public order of human
dignity is a disciplined appraisal of alternative
choices of immediate consequences in terms of pre-
ferred long-term effects, and not in either the ti-
mid foreswearing of concern for immediate consequen-
ces cr in the quixotic search for criteria of deci-
sion that transcend the world of men and values in
metaphysical fantasy. The reference of legal prin-
ciples must be either to their internal-logical--
arrangement or to their external consequences of
their application. It remains mysterious what
criteria for decisions a "neutral" system could of-
fer.92
The basic premises of inquiry of the New Haven school in an explicit pre-
911d. at 27. Compare with Professor Rostow's genuine concern:
The "relocation camps" conducted during World War II
for Japanese residents and for Americans of Japanese
descent are the precedent for the proposal that con-
centration camps be established for citizens suspec-
ted by believing in revolutionary ideas. Thus can
the protection of the writ of habeas corpus be ero-
ded, and the principle lost that criminal punishment
can be inflicted only for criminal behavior and then
only after a trial by jury conducted according to the
rules of the Bill of Rights. Thus can we be led to
accept the ideas and techniques of the police state.
Rostow, "The Democratic Character of Judicial Review," 66 Harv. L. Rev.
193, 207-208 (1952)..
9 2 cDougal, "Perspectives for an International Law of Human Dignity,"
(1959] Proceedings, Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 107, 121. Reprinted in McDougal &
Associates, Studies in World Public Order 987 (1960).
ference for "human dignity" at the highest level of abstraction.93 With
the perspective of members of the whole of mankind, McDougal and his as-
sociates recommend for contmitment the maximization of values of human dig-
nity. Values of human dignity are not, as some critics suggest, a mys-9 4
terious notion derived from the metaphysical command or Western values.
To suggest that peoples other than Europeans do not seek values for a dig-
nified human existence is to insult them. These values are continuous de-
mands of human beings throughout the history of mankind in different cul-
tures and communities;95 they have been endorsed in various degrees of
abstraction and justification by the United Nations Charter, by the In-
ternational Covenants on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and on
Civil and Political Rights and by many other international agreements
and national decisions. 96rhe recommendation of these values, however, is
not intended as requiring the uniformity of detailed practices and insti-
tutional patterns. Once they are accepted as policy goals institutional
creativity and diversity are encouraged in the processes for shaping and
sharing of values. In a pluralistic society a dignified human existence
will not be achieved by imposing one version of institutional practice or
public order.
9For a detailed specification of human rights, see McDougal, Lass-
well & Chen, "Human Eights and World Public Order: A Framework for Po-
licy-Oriented Inquiry," 63 Am. J. Int'l L. 237 (1969); and McDougal, su-
pra note 63.
94Professor Haas asserts that numerous programs for the protection
of humin rights are based on "traditional Western values rather than the
concept of collective freedom more current in the Third World. Hence,
European and Western Hemisphere trends run counter to trends elsewhere."
Haas, supra note 38 at 119-120. This simplistic contraposition of "in-
dividual human rights" and "collective rights" may prove useless once
specific empirical references are given to such verbal labels in terms
of who wants "collective" rights to achieve what outcomes. Collective
rights are the aggregate of individual rights to promote community values.
9 5 Cf. Gunnar Myrdal, supra note 22 at 77-82.
96The global demands for basic values may be found in Ian Brownlie
(ed.), Basic Documents on Human Rights (1971).
In a ceaselessly changing pluralistic world, the clarificatio, and
specification of goal values cannot be performed by a definitional state-
ment of "the natural law component"97 or by efforts of climbing up the
logical hierarchy which leads nowhere, but only by the systematic and
disciplined performance of relevant intellectual tasks. Those who cri-
ticize these values as irrelevant should assume the burden of presenting
an alternative set of goal values and take the responsibility for doing
so.
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2. Description of Past Trends in Decision
The second intellectual task is trend studies.. Trends are charac-
terized by authoritative responses to the demands made by contending claim-
ants that controversies sterwing from their social interaction be solved.
The continuing flow of these responses or decisions create and reinforce
expectations in the world community. Effective decision made on the ba-
sis of these expectations is law. Description of the pattern of past de-
cisions should not be meraly "anecdoctal in terms of isolated tidbits of
doctrine and practice, but rather systematic in terms of degrees of ap-
proximation to clarified policies"99 for a given community. Thus, the
purpose of trend studies should not be solely to discover what happened
in the past, to unearth "precedents" for the sake of precedent. The de-
scription must be made in terms of departure from or approximation to
claritied community policies which the observer recommends. When there
is no significant decision in the past with respect to a given claim,
"doctrine" can be treated as constituting past trends.
Past decisions can be grouped into clusters of claims having common
policies and contextual features and each cluster can be further broken
down, depending upon a thoroughness of study. A trend study is analyti-
cal in that it surveys how particular decisions were made in the past and
how, as a result, major values were shaped and allocated toward or away
from specified goals. Under each claim, the five intellectual tasks
must, in principle, be performed:100 (1) the clarification of basic policy
9 7Haas, supra note 38 at 132.
9 9Hyrdal, supra npte 2 2 at 73-76.
9 9 Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 33 at 391.
1 00Examine McDougal, Lasswell & Vlasic, supra note 61, at 193. A
chapter, "Claims Relating to Access and Competence in the Domain or Space"
P a detailed analysis of one group of claims. One single claim can be
analyzed at length as the principles of economy and appropriate seleLtivity
regarding the claim in question, (2) the description of trends in deci-
sion, (3) the analysis of conditioning factors affecting decision, (4)
the projection of the future trends, and (5) the invention of alterna-
tives which will contribute to the realization of goals.
3. Analysis of Conditioning Factors Affecting Decision.
Trends in decision demonstrate the degree of discrepancy between the
actual pattern of decision and clarified community goals. This discrepancy
may be explained by analyzing conditioning factors affecting past decisions,
In that all decisions are made within a range of capabilities. Condition-
ing factors are predispositional and environmental variables which affect
individual decision-makers, the range of options from which they can choose,
and the degree of possible effectiveness of decision. Such conditions in-
clude the decision-makers' personality, culture, class, interests, past
experiences, as well as the political climate at the time he makes a
partiLcL|ar decision.
Analysis of conditioning factors seeks to identify phenomena that
affPc- the realization of human dignity and to discover the relations
between the outcome of social interaction. The New Haven school regards
law as a process of decision in which authority and control serve as in-
struments to guide and shape choices directly affecting the features of
public order. These choices must be made to achieve community goals.
Thus, in policy-oriented performance of the acientific task, the school's
primary concern is not with mere sets of rules or something written on
paper, but with consequences brought about the application and creation
of a certain decision in a particular context. The process of decision
is a continuing response to claims made by people who seek to secure their
preferred interests. In this pluralistic world where numerous groups
and individuals represent competing as well as conflicting interests,
nobody can escape from making a choice from among many complementary
norms and from responsibility for that choice. The analysis of con-
ditioning factors explains the reason why a particular decision was
made.and how it was put into effect. The aggregate flow of these choices
permit. Five intellectual tasks are performed in a very similar manner
as the book is organized. Likewise, take McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, "Na-
tionality and Human Rights: The Protection of the Individual in External
Arenas," 83 Yale L. J. 900 (1974). This article is a sub-sub-section of
a chapter, "Claims Relating to Power," see McDougal, "Human Rights and
World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure for Clarifying
General Community Policies," 14 Va. J. Int'l L. 387, 407 (1974), and
the sub-sub-section, "Claims to be protected in external interactions
(nationalityl" itself contains the same intellectual format. See the
table of contents at 83 Yale L. J. 900 (1974).
through time constitutes the process of "sanction" which maintains the
quality of public order.101 As Kelsen has written, "[t]he view . . .
that the verbal expression of legal norm has only one 'true' meaning
which can be discovered by correct interpretation is a fiction, adopted
to maintain the illusion of legal security, to make the law-seeking pub-
lic believe that there is only one possible answer to the question of
law in a concrete case.",1 02 When there are two or more possible inter-
pretations of a legal norm or choices of norms, which interpretation or
norm should be taken can be an immediate concern for the pattern of value
shaping and sharing. The oft-repeated "true-meaning" of a legal norm is
said to be "discovered" in the intent of legislators. However, the "true
will" of the legislator is also a product of the social process and is af-
fected by not only prior legislation but by many predispositional and en-
vironmental variables. In the process of law-making legislators undergo
many phases of a complex procedure of negotiations and bargainings. Kel-
sen wrote elsewhere:
The "Jurists" believe and would like to persuade
others that they possess an objective or even a
scientific method which permits them to desiguate
the single "Just" meaning from among those which
the interpretation reveals. In reality no such
method can only be dictated by a judgment of sub-
jective, political value.10 3
Recognizing the nature of the decision-making process, the New Haven
school does not conceive "law" and "policy" as distinct. Rather, it-
maintains that every application of legal doctrines, be they customary
or conventional, to specific factual situations requires the making of
policy choices. For every decision made at any level of community is to
affect the pattern of value production and distrihution. A decision is,
therefore, a policy involving sanctions.
Law is not mere authoritative rules, formal doctrines, or policy
crystallizations of the past. When it is observed as a static body of
rules, the nature of the decision-making process is neglected and ob-
scured. The process of decision-making is, in part, the continuous pro-
cess of redefinition of formal doctrine in its application to ever-chang-
ing facts and claims within the limit of capabilities by which a formal
doctrine is given a meaning and made effective.
• 10Reisman, "Sanctions and Enforcement," 3 Black & Falk (eds.), The
Future of the International Legal Order 273 (1972).
102Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations xiv (1950).
103
Hans Kelsen, Legal Technique in Internationnl Law: A Textual Cri-
tique of the Covenant of the League, Geneva Studies Vol. X, No. 6, at 14-
15 (1939).
4. Projection of Fure Trends.
No responsible decision-maker or observer who recommends a cer-
tain policy can be indifferent about future consequences of a particu-
lar action, let alone its immediate result. Unlike many scientific
studies which are backward oriented which summarize past data or verify
events which occurred in the past-in essence, policy is future-oriented.
And the future, like the past, is contextual. Since any effective deci-
sion depends upon expectations about the future, these assumptions must
be subjected to disciplined inquiry and procedures for their assessment
about conditioning factors and past changes in the composition of trends.
5. Invention and Evaluation of Policy Alternatives.
The fifth and last intellectual task is the "pay-off" function in
a problem-oriented approach. If the goal we set at the outset is to
be pursued, we must invent the most effective and advantageous stiate-
gies for realizing that goal. This ig the creative invention and evalu-
ation of policy alternatives. A decision must be made in such a way as
to Increase value effects toward greater conformity with all clarified
goals.
When there are two or more possible interpretations or norms, the
decision-mak-r always has a choice between them. At this point, the New
Haven and the Vienna schools move to opposite poles. Although both
schools share some views about the rature of decision-making, they draw
very different conclusions from them. Kelsen aIntained that "the reali-
zation of the social aim" is "the function of -Lho politician to deter-
mine"1 0 4 but "the task of a legal scientist inerpreting a legal instru-
ment is to show its possible meanings and to leoe it to the competent
legal authority to choose in accordance with political principles the one
with which this authority (the official] thinks the most appropriate."1 05
The choice between the different meanings of a legal norm, if not guided
and determined by a legal norm of a higher standing, is determined by
extra-legal norms, that is, by political norms. Such an intrusion of
political norms, contends Kelsen, should not be permitted in pursuit of
knowledge. Thus, Kelsen insisted that policy consideration "is not ju-
ridical but specifically political. It is the domain par excellence of
the politicians."1 06 The Kelsenians insist that politics should be di-
104Id. at 15.
105Hans Kelsen, What Is Justice? 368 (1957).
10 6Kelsen, supra note 103 at 15.
vorced from the science of law because the legal scientist's task is
to search for "truth" and it should be independent of politics. "Sci-
ence," Kelsen asserted, "is a function of cognition; its aim is not to
govern but to explain. To describe the world is its object."'I07 And
the separation of science from politics demands the scientist "restrict
himself to an explanation and a description of his object without judging
it as good or bad, that is, as being in conformity with, or contrary to,
a presupposed value."1 08 Kelsen, therefore, described his position as
a scientist faced with two or more possible interpretations of a legal
norm to the effect that:
In showing the possibilities which the law to be
applied opens to the legal authority [officials],
the legal scientist scientifically serves the law-
applying function; and in revealing the anbiguity,
and thus the necessity for improving the wording,
he serves the law-creating function in a scientific
way. If the legal scientist recommends to the le-
gal authority one of the different meanings of a
legal norm, he tries to influence the law-making
process and exercises a political, not a scienti-
fic, function; if he presents this interpretation
as the only correct one, he is acting as a politi-
cian in the disguise of a scientist.
I09
The New Haven school stands in sharp contrast with this insistence
that the legal scientist or the scholarly observer should not make the
choice between accepting or rejecting the law on the basis of his judg-
ment about what is good and bad. A policy-oriented jurisprudence strikes
down the myth that "science" has a value-free or neutral function. It
insists that the legal scientist must be a responsible citize of the
world community and should extend "his role beyond mere inquiry into an
advice about legal syntacts . . . to the further tasks of inquiry into
advice about the possible effects upon overall community values of the
various alternatives that the legal forms afford."1 1 0
10 7Kelsen, supra note 105 at 350.
10 8Ibid
.
10 91d. at 368.
110McDougal, supra note 87 at 157.
There then arises the question as to the range of possible practi-
cal applications of the information scientists possess. If the possi-
bility of its applicatic-a into practice is always only one, there is no-
thing to be concerned with in terms of the desirability of the role of
scientist as an adviser to a "Prince." The question with which the sci-
entists are faced in daily life is, rather, whether or not their task is
limited merely to explaining "a world" and posing prcblems for future ac-
tion and thus simply leaving the question how to solve them in the hands
of official decision-makers only. 1 1 1 Science cannot be identical with
"the product of inquiry." Science is an on-going, endless "process" of
inquiry into what science produces.11 2 And a task for scientist in this
process of inquiry is to clarify the goals of inquiry to which the allo-
cation of knowledge will be made for the promotion of certain values.113
This approach, originated by Lasswell, has been called policy science,114
i.e., the study of policy which promotes democratic values. Lasswell
has written that
By laying the accent on policy we are not attack-
ing objectivity. On the contrary, objectivity is
just where it belongs, which is in the service of
good values. Policy includes not only breathless,
short-run objectivities: policy also comprises in-
termediate and long range aims and it is-in relation
to the latter that scientists can make their greatest
contribution .115
Critics of policy science assert that its adherent, who seeks to
gather intelligence and enlightenment about policy issues and make re-
11 See Robert S. Lynd, Knowledge for What? (1939) and K. Mannheim,
Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (1940); particularly chs.
IV, V, VI.
11 2Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry 400 (1964).
113Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama 5-8 (1968).
114see, generally, Harold D. Lasswell, Pre-View of Policy Sciences
(1971); see also Lasswell, Power and Personality 108-147 (1948); and
Daniel Lerner & Lasswell (eds.), The Policy Sciences (1951); Lasswell,
The Future of Political Science (1963).
115Lasswell, Power and Personality 122 (1948).
commendations to decision makers,"will, at best, 'turn into an administrator,
distinguished from some of his colleagues only by having been recruited
from the intellectual community,' or turn into a gadfly, or become the
politician's Peeping Tom. 1 1 6 At worst,
he will become the docile or deceived "expert" who
obligingly shows to the decision-makers how they
can best use for their purposes the techniques of
his own field, and who shows to his colleagues how
the decision-makers' purposes and his original goals
really amount to the same thing. The result, I sub-
mit, is a violation of the scholar's duty to serve
truth and of his necessary commitment to freedom
without which the search for truth is a farce.
1 1 7
The misconception that "the manipulative standpoint" and "the contempla-
tive standpoint" are mutually exclusive is obvious in their observation.
The overriding policy consideration is, of course, the promotion of values
of human dignity in the highest level of abstraction. Iu each instance we
will be able to go down the ladder of abstraction to the specific goal.
In fact without the promotion of these basic values, "the search for truth",
which Professor Stanley Hoffmarpasserts as a primary duty of a scientist,
can hardly be conducted. A critical question is the degree to which one
is conscious of policy preconceptions. The divorce from the basic policy
and the invention of an alternative to achieve that policy does not set
science free, but rather render it the captive of prejudice, biases, and
the expedience of power, and furthermore, policy devoid of the scientific
inquiry and guidance is doomed to lose its rational orientation fur the
promotion of the basic values of human dignity.
The policy recommendation the New Haven school seeks is based on
reasonableness in a particular context of issues. The reasonableness
of the scope and range of value demands made by claimants in their in-
teractions are examined with reference to policies of the maximization
of basic .alues for a dignified human existence.
In the world which lacks a centralized organ to pass judgment upon
the lawfulness of action, state officials assume the most important role
In the world decision process. National decision-makers are simultaneously
concerned with exclusive interests and inclusive interests in the present
16 Stanley hoffmann, Contemporary Theories in International Rela-
tions 11 (1960).
-17ibid.
highly interdependent world community; they serve a dual function an claimants
on the one hand, and as external decision-makers passing judgment upon the
claims of others on the other hand. Reasonableness as the basis of law-
fulness is sought by striking the balance of minimum exclusive interests
and maximum inclusive interests in context, and thus a passive principle
of lawfulness based on "illegality not proven" is rejectea in the New la-
yen school. 1 1 8 Reasonableness in a particular context does not mean ex-
pediency or particular aims, but the disciplined ascription of policy im-
port to varying factors in appraising their operational and functional sig-
nificance for community goals in a given instance of ciams and coufnter-
claims. A decision in terms of "reasonableness" is the very opposite of
"arbitrariness." The postulation of the basic values of human dignity as
the basis of appraisal does not mean that "adherence to values of tuch a
kind or in such a way as to interfere with scientific objectivity"
111 9 is
necessary. Such an adherence may be called a bias, and indeed "values,"
writes Abraham Kaplan, "makes for bias, not when they dictate problem,
but when they prejudge solutions.",120
The New Haven school thus rejects the validity or relevancy of "pre-
cedents" for the sake of the consistency to the ceremonial pattern of de-
cision in the past.121 Consistency in, and confor--ation to, "decision" we
need desperately are the actual pattern of policy embodied in decision
which result in greater approximation to human dignity. The past deci-
sions made in a different social context cannot dictate simultaneously
what is and what ought to be in the future.
1 2 2 The survey of the past
8ee McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 64 at 216, 209n. See also
McDougal & Schlei, "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful lMea-
sures for Security," 64 Yale L. J. 648 (1955), reprinted in McDougal and
Associates, supra note 92 at 763. But, cf. Anderson, "A Critique of Pro-
fessor Myres S. McDougal's Doctrine of Interpretation 
by major Purposes,"
57 Am. J. Int'l L. 379 (1963).
119Kaplan, supra note 110 at 398.
1 20Id. at 382.
123V. M. Reisman, supra note 65 at 235-36.
1 2 2This is what is referred to as a "normative- ,z ,na" statement.
A normative statement which can mean, indiscriminately. a policy of past
decisions, a projection of future decisions, an indiv-fal speaker'a pre-
decisions is important, however, to clarify to what extent the goals we
prefer have been realized or not. Not infrequently, we would find that
past decisions exhibit the gap in reality between goals we want to achieve
and actual outcomes. This disparity may be explained by analyzing condi-
tions which accounted for particular decisions in the past. When we pro-
ject probable future developments, we may encounter the situation where
the continuation of the existing patterns of public order will perpetuate
the trend a,-ay from the goals we prefer. We must, then, consider the
probable value consequences of alternatives upon not only immediate pat-
ties concerned, but also larger communities in space and long range ef-
fects thereupon in time. The New Haven school calls for innovative and
creative change in decision patterns so as to approximate the goals. As
McDougal aptly stated, "law is not a frozen cake of doctrine designed on-
ly to protect interests in status quo."'123 Hence, the dichotomous prin-
ciples of lex lata and lex ferenda are not useful unless they are comple-
mented by other relevant intellectual tasks.
V. Appraisal
The New Haven school has aided contemporary scholars and decision-
makers alike to construct adequate tools for the stui3of the interrela-
tions of law and the world social process. Its thr.e-)vajor characteris-
tics are: (1) it is contextual, in that all relevant variables of the
social process of immediate concern in relation to the whole context of
the world social process are taken into account in the focus of inquiry;
(2) it is problem-oriented, in that it contributes to the solution of the
exigent problems by offering specific tools appropriate for inquiry; and
(3) it is multi-method, in that it provides a comprehensive set of intel-
lectual skills, procedures, and analytical framework for rational decision-
making. The application of the comprehensive analytical framework makes
it possible to relate the authority process to the power process by bring-
Ing "some of the best contemporary critical thought" from other disciplines
to bear upon the study of law, and thereby contributing to ascertaining
common interests in particular claims, i.e., to discovering a policy which
facilitates the greater production and wider distribution of values of hu-
man dignity. The true scientific value and significance of the New Haven
ference for certain future decisions, or any combination of these. A nor-
mative proposition without a delineation of policy in a context necessarily
confuses performance of legal tasks. See Lasswell & McDougal, "Legal Edu-
cation and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest,"
52 Yale L. J. 203 (1943), reprinted in McDougal & Associates, supra note
91 at 42, 119.
12 fcDovgal, "Law and Power," 46 Am. J. Int'l L. 102, Ill (1952).
school is its approach which is founded in the careful craftmanship, depth
and breadth of research. It is "its focus on norm generation and the sti-
muli to It''124 to which we are compelled to pay respact, but not necessarily
to-its "substantive output", i.e., the personal views of those who use the
approach on particular issue. In fact, the New Haven school has long been
Identified with Professors McDougal and Lasswell, originators and promotors
of their theory about law. The real strength of the New Haven jurisprudence,
however, lies in a flexibility and broad-mindedness which encourages students
to undertake experiments and modifications of the approach in their applica-
tion to critical problems. As is frequently the case with personalized
theories, the "cult of personality" which does not permit deviation from
tha originator's own doctrine has never developed about McDougal and Lass-
well. Professor Eugene V. Rostow has observed that "the most remarkable
feature of McDougal's influence as a teacher is that so few of his pupils
experience a need to demonstrate their independence by rebelling ...
He has established not a sect, .but a school. In almost every case, his
students are indeed scholars, not acolytes. What they learn from McDou-
gal and Lasswell is a systematic way to study law, and to judge it, as an
Integral part of the social process, in its relationship to all the forces,
social and moral, which shape the law, and guide its course through time."125
VI. For the Future
126
As Frederick S. Tipson points out, the Yale Law School as the re-
source of young scholars contributed tremendously to the development of
the New Haven school. Graduate law students, both American and non-Ameri-
can, who had been seeking a problem-oriented approach beyond the conven-
tional intellectual framework, were readily attracted to McDougal and Lass-
well. Those graduate students who developed their own skill through per-
sonal contact and friendship with their teachers have now formed a broader
"constituency" for the New Haven school. Many of them are assuming lead-
ing roles in their own schools.
C24 ould and Barkun, International Law and the Social Scieaces 197
(1970).
125Rostow, "Book Review," 82 Yale L. J. 829, 831 (1973).
126Tipson, "The Laswell-McDougal Enterprise: Toward A World Public
Order of Human Dignity," 14 Va. J. Int'l L. 535, 584 (1974).
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The future of the New Haven school, however, lies not so much in per-
sonal contact with McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman in Yale's classrooms as
In a national association for a continuing seminar in Law, Science, and
Policy transcending the classroom of Yale. Such an association will be
a forum as well as a medium for those who are interested in a policy-
oriented approach to promote the needs of a jurisprudential considera-
tion of policy and foster such study. To be viable through time, any
school must reach beyond a single institution. An open, inclusive asso-
ciation aimed at fostering the study of law and policy and improving the
intellectual apparatus for rational decision, is an imperative necessity
today. A national journal specialized in law and policy may be a medium
for the promotion and dissemination of these ideas.
